Aaron Spurling sent me an exchange he had with ChatGPT regarding some of the philosophical underpinnings of anarchy. I spoke with Aaron during Episode 13 regarding Stoic philosophy.
ChatGPT seems to have performed quite well and produced genuinely interesting results. The exchange is very interesting, and it forced me, by reading it, to clarify some of my own thoughts on the subject. Aaron also shared this experience and had this to say about the experience, “I had long been aware in a general way that my position depends in part on a rejection of utilitarianism and social contract theory, but this exchange really drove that home for me. I think that’s quite a useful outcome of the experiment.”
Here is the exchange:
Model: GPT-4
Aaron Spurling
Act as a philosopher and evaluate the following argument: Premise 1: All actions that are based on the initiation of violence or the threat of the initiation of violence are unjust. Premise 2: All governmental actions are based on the initiation of violence or the threat of the initiation of violence. Conclusion: All governmental actions are unjust.
ChatGPT
As a philosopher, I would examine this argument’s structure, premises, and conclusion critically. The argument is formed in a valid manner, structurally. If both premises were true, the conclusion would logically follow. This is a classic example of a syllogism, a form of deductive reasoning consisting of two premises leading to a conclusion. But the soundness of the argument — whether the premises are true — is where more attention is needed.
Premise 1: “All actions that are based on the initiation of violence or the threat of the initiation of violence are unjust.” This premise seems to be based on a deontological ethical perspective, which focuses on the inherent morality of actions rather than their outcomes. If we accept this premise, we’re assuming that violence or its threat is inherently unjust, regardless of its purpose or results. This is a matter of ethical debate. For instance, a consequentialist or utilitarian might argue that some violent actions could be justified if they prevent greater harm or injustice.
Premise 2: “All governmental actions are based on the initiation of violence or the threat of the initiation of violence.” This premise seems to be an oversimplification. While it’s true that many governmental actions involve some form of coercion, which could be seen as a kind of violence or its threat, it’s not accurate to say all governmental actions are based on violence. Consider public health programs, environmental regulations, or the provision of public goods like parks or education. These actions, while they may involve enforcement mechanisms, are not inherently violent. Therefore, this premise seems to be flawed.
Conclusion: “All governmental actions are unjust.” Given the problems with the premises, particularly the second one, we can’t confidently arrive at this conclusion. Even if we accept that all actions based on violence or its threat are unjust (which is a contentious point), we haven’t convincingly established that all governmental actions fall into this category.
This argument appears to reflect a libertarian or anarchist philosophical perspective, which often emphasizes the coercion inherent in governmental power. However, it simplifies the nature of both violence and government, which makes the argument less convincing. A more nuanced understanding of both could lead to different conclusions. For instance, one might argue that some governmental actions are unjust, or that actions based on violence can be just under certain circumstances.
Aaron Spurling
First of all, please note that I specifically referenced the initiation of violence or the threat of the initiation of violence. This is not the same thing at all as the use of violence or the threat of the use of violence. That is, use is not the same thing as initiation because one can justly use violence in self-defense. By contrast, we’re speaking here of the initiation of violence that is not in self-defense. Does that alter your analysis?
ChatGPT
Your clarification is a valuable distinction in this philosophical discourse, as it refines the definition of violence to specifically focus on initiation rather than just the act itself. This indeed changes the framing of the argument and the evaluation of its premises.
Premise 1: “All actions that are based on the initiation of violence or the threat of the initiation of violence are unjust.” The focus on the initiation of violence rather than the use of it implies a specific ethical position that values non-aggression. The Non-Aggression Principle, commonly associated with libertarian philosophies, holds that it’s inherently wrong to initiate force against another person. If we agree with this principle, the first premise can be seen as true. However, there are still philosophical debates about this, as some might argue there are situations where initiating force can lead to better outcomes or prevent larger injustices.
Premise 2: “All governmental actions are based on the initiation of violence or the threat of the initiation of violence.” This premise still seems overly broad. It’s correct that the state often maintains a monopoly on the legitimate use of physical force, which may involve initiating violence in some cases. However, it’s too sweeping to state that all governmental actions involve initiating violence. Many governmental actions are regulatory or administrative, and while they rely on the implicit authority of the state, they do not actively initiate violence. Also, some governmental actions might be seen as defensive rather than initiatory, such as laws and regulations designed to protect citizens from harm.
The conclusion: “All governmental actions are unjust.” The clarifications you’ve made help strengthen the argument, but the second premise still seems problematic. While it is more plausible with the refined understanding of violence, it still overgeneralizes the nature of governmental actions. To conclude that all government actions are unjust, we would need to establish without doubt that all government actions involve the initiation of violence, which is a difficult case to make.
Overall, your argument is stronger with the clarification, but it still depends heavily on the acceptance of both premises. The discussion could be deepened by exploring the nature of violence initiation and the concept of what constitutes ‘unjust’ action. Philosophers might also question whether the initiation of violence could be justified under certain circumstances, or how we define violence in the context of government actions.
Aaron Spurling
Here’s another clarification. All governmental actions require the expenditure of some resources, however small they might be. The only resources the government owns are those it extracts from the people by the initiation of violence or the threat of the initiation of violence. Therefore, all governmental actions even regulatory and administrative ones, are based upon the initiation of violence or the threat of the initiation of violence. Does this change your analysis?
ChatGPT
Your clarification provides an additional layer of complexity to the argument. By asserting that all governmental resources are obtained through some form of initiation of violence or threat thereof (presumably through taxation or other forms of mandatory contributions), you’re broadening the definition of violence to include economic compulsion. This is a significant shift that does indeed change the analysis.
Premise 1 remains the same, and it’s still reliant on the acceptance of the Non-Aggression Principle or a similar ethical stance that regards the initiation of violence as inherently unjust.
Premise 2, with your clarification, becomes: “All governmental actions, by nature of requiring resources obtained through the initiation of violence or the threat of the initiation of violence, are based on the initiation of violence or the threat of the initiation of violence.” This new formulation is more robust, as it establishes a clearer link between governmental actions and the initiation of violence.
The conclusion: “All governmental actions are unjust” now follows more logically from the premises. However, the argument is still subject to critique.
One key contention point lies in whether taxation or other forms of compulsory contributions should be seen as an initiation of violence. This is not universally accepted. Some might argue that these contributions are part of a social contract, where citizens agree to provide resources to the government in exchange for services and protection. From this perspective, taxation is not an initiation of violence but rather a mutually agreed-upon exchange.
In addition, the Non-Aggression Principle itself is a topic of philosophical debate. While many agree with its premise, there are others who argue that there might be cases where the initiation of violence is morally acceptable or even necessary, such as preventing a greater harm.
So, while your clarified argument is logically consistent and more robust, its acceptance still largely depends on one’s ethical and political philosophy. In this case, it leans heavily toward a libertarian or anarchist viewpoint, where state power and taxation are seen as inherently coercive and unjust. Others with different philosophical leanings might challenge the premises or the conclusion, leading to further debate.
Aaron Spurling
Regarding the issue of taxation, if one does not pay one’s taxes, government agents will place the non-payer under arrest and he will be sent to prison. That is a form of initiation of violence. Most people pay their taxes in order to avoid that result. Thus, taxation is based on the initiation of violence or the threat of the initiation of violence. Does that change your analysis?
ChatGPT
Your argument now hinges on the assertion that taxation, because of its compulsory nature and the potential for punitive action (including the use of force) in cases of non-compliance, is a form of initiated violence or the threat thereof. This perspective is indeed consistent with certain libertarian and anarcho-capitalist viewpoints. Let’s consider how this clarification impacts the analysis:
Premise 1: “All actions that are based on the initiation of violence or the threat of the initiation of violence are unjust.” As before, this premise is reliant on the acceptance of the Non-Aggression Principle or a similar ethical stance.
Premise 2, with your additional clarification, becomes: “All governmental actions, by nature of requiring resources obtained through compulsory taxation (which, if not paid, can lead to the initiation of violence or the threat of initiation of violence), are based on the initiation of violence or the threat of the initiation of violence.” This reformulation makes the premise more compelling, as it articulates a more explicit link between governmental actions and the initiation of violence.
The conclusion: “All governmental actions are unjust” follows logically from these two premises.
However, the argument still has points of contention. As stated before, the interpretation of taxation as an initiation of violence is not universally accepted. Many political philosophies argue that taxation is a requirement of societal functioning and is part of the social contract. From this viewpoint, citizens implicitly agree to taxation as a condition of receiving the benefits of living in a structured society, including protection, public services, infrastructure, and so on.
Moreover, the concept of unjust is also complex. In a consequentialist view, actions that result in the greater overall good can be considered just, even if they involve some form of force or coercion. For example, taxes used to build public infrastructure or provide healthcare could be seen as just, despite the coercive nature of taxation, because they produce significant societal benefits.
In conclusion, your refined argument is indeed logical and consistent within its own definitions and assumptions. It presents a valid critique of governmental action from a perspective rooted in the Non-Aggression Principle. However, its acceptance is largely dependent on individual ethical and political beliefs, and it is likely to be challenged by those who view taxation, and the social contract more broadly, differently.
Aaron Spurling
Assume that consequentialism and utilitarianism are false. Does that change your analysis?
ChatGPT
If we assume that consequentialism and utilitarianism are false, or in other words, we discount the ethical stance that the morality of an action is determined by its outcome, we would be left with deontological ethics or virtue ethics as our guiding principles.
Deontological ethics focus on the inherent rightness or wrongness of actions, while virtue ethics focus on the character and virtues of the moral agent. If we adopt a deontological perspective (which seems to be the implicit basis for your argument, given the focus on the initiation of violence as inherently unjust), the analysis would change somewhat.
Premise 1: “All actions that are based on the initiation of violence or the threat of the initiation of violence are unjust.” Assuming a deontological standpoint, this premise holds true. Initiation of violence would be considered inherently wrong, regardless of the potential outcomes.
Premise 2: “All governmental actions, by nature of requiring resources obtained through compulsory taxation (which, if not paid, can lead to the initiation of violence or the threat of initiation of violence), are based on the initiation of violence or the threat of the initiation of violence.” This premise becomes stronger under the deontological viewpoint as well, as it focuses on the inherent action (taxation enforced by the threat of violence) rather than its outcomes.
The conclusion: “All governmental actions are unjust” would follow logically from these premises, within the context of deontological ethics.
However, even within this framework, there are still points of contention. For example, the social contract theory could be brought into the discussion. Some deontologists argue that living within a society means accepting certain obligations, including the payment of taxes, which are used to fund government actions. From this perspective, taxation, even when enforced by potential punitive measures, might not be seen as an unjust initiation of violence, but rather as part of a mutually agreed-upon societal obligation.
Furthermore, in a virtue ethics approach, the focus would be on the virtues or moral character of the individual or institution performing the action. This would require a different analysis, and the conclusion might not be the same, as the inherent virtue of actions could be seen differently.
So, assuming consequentialism and utilitarianism to be false does indeed change the analysis, making your argument stronger within a deontological framework. But the argument is still subject to debate, depending on one’s interpretation of the social contract, the nature of taxation, and the inherent morality of initiating violence.
Aaron Spurling
Further, assume that the social contract theory is false. Does that change your analysis?
ChatGPT
If we assume that the social contract theory is false, we reject the idea that citizens implicitly agree to the authority of the state in exchange for the protection and services it provides. This could indeed change the analysis.
Premise 1: “All actions that are based on the initiation of violence or the threat of the initiation of violence are unjust.” Under a deontological viewpoint, this premise remains true.
Premise 2: “All governmental actions, by nature of requiring resources obtained through compulsory taxation (which, if not paid, can lead to the initiation of violence or the threat of initiation of violence), are based on the initiation of violence or the threat of the initiation of violence.” Rejecting the social contract theory strengthens this premise, as it removes a key counter-argument that compulsory taxation is part of an agreed-upon exchange within society.
The conclusion: “All governmental actions are unjust” follows logically from these premises if we accept a deontological ethical framework and reject both consequentialism and social contract theory.
Under these assumptions, your argument is indeed valid and logically consistent. It offers a strong critique of the nature of governmental power from a certain ethical and political perspective. However, it’s important to note that these assumptions (the rejection of consequentialism, utilitarianism, and social contract theory, and the acceptance of a strict non-aggression principle) are not universally agreed upon. While this argument may be compelling to those who hold these views, others with different philosophical beliefs might not find it convincing.
Moreover, even within a strictly deontological framework, there can be different interpretations and nuances. Some deontologists might argue that not all initiation of violence is inherently unjust, depending on the context and motivations. Nonetheless, if we adhere strictly to your premises and the assumptions you provided, your argument is indeed logically consistent and valid.
Aaron Spurling
You’ve stated that “Some deontologists might argue that not all initiation of violence is inherently unjust, depending on the context and motivations.” While continuing with the assumptions we’ve made that consequentialism, utilitarianism, and social contract theory are false, please give me some examples of initiation of violence that some deontologists would argue are not inherently unjust.
ChatGPT
If we stick with the assumptions that consequentialism, utilitarianism, and social contract theory are false, a deontological framework would indeed generally hold that the initiation of violence is inherently unjust. The Non-Aggression Principle, which is part of many deontological theories, specifically posits this.
However, even within a deontological framework, some variations might allow for exceptions. For example, certain forms of what could be considered “initiation of violence” might be seen as justifiable under very specific circumstances.
One example could be the notion of “defensive violence” or “preemptive self-defense.” Some deontologists might argue that if there is clear and imminent threat of harm, then initiating violence to prevent that harm could be morally acceptable. For instance, if a person is pointing a gun at you and expressing intent to shoot, some would argue that you would be morally justified in initiating violence to disarm or disable them, even before they have actually initiated violence against you.
Another example could be related to protecting those who cannot protect themselves, such as children or incapacitated individuals. If a person was about to harm a child, for instance, a deontologist might argue that it would be morally acceptable to initiate violence against that person to prevent the harm.
It’s important to note that these examples are contentious and not all deontologists would agree with them. They hinge on the idea that the “initiation of violence” might be morally justifiable in cases where it is used to prevent an immediate and certain harm. These situations are often seen as more “reactive” or “defensive” rather than initiatory, but they do involve the first physical action, so they could technically be seen as an “initiation” of violence.
Again, these are exceptions and not the rule within a deontological framework. And they rely on very specific circumstances where there is an immediate and certain threat of harm. In most cases, deontologists would indeed argue that the initiation of violence is inherently unjust.
Aaron Spurling
Each of the examples of “defensive violence” or “preemptive self-defense” that you gave involve the initiation of violence or the threat of the initiation of violence by the other person. For example, when a person points a gun at you and expresses the intent to shoot, that person has made a threat of initiating violence. When you respond violently to that threat, you are not the one initiating or threatening to initiate violence. Rather, it’s the person pointing the gun who is doing so. A similar response could be given to your other examples as well. Can you give any examples that are not subject to that criticism?
ChatGPT
You are correct in your analysis; the examples provided indeed can be seen as responses to threats of violence rather than initiations of violence. My aim was to illustrate potential exceptions within a deontological framework where what could be technically seen as an “initiation” of violence (being the first to physically act) might be morally justifiable. But I understand that they might not be the kind of examples you were asking for.
Given the assumptions we’re working with – namely, that consequentialism, utilitarianism, and social contract theory are false – it’s challenging to find examples where the initiation of violence would be justified within a deontological framework. Deontology, especially in its stricter forms, often holds that certain actions (like the initiation of violence) are categorically wrong, regardless of the circumstances.
However, one example that might be seen as an initiation of violence within a deontological framework is the use of force to prevent someone from unknowingly walking into a deadly situation, such as pushing someone out of the way of a falling object. In this case, the use of force (pushing the person) could technically be seen as an initiation of violence, but some deontologists might argue that it is morally justifiable because it is done to prevent a greater harm (the person being hit by the falling object). However, even this example could be debated, as it may be seen as a response to an imminent threat rather than an initiation of violence.
As these examples show, the concept of “initiation of violence” can be complex and is subject to different interpretations. Your argument, which categorically views the initiation of violence as unjust, aligns with a strict interpretation of the Non-Aggression Principle, which is a cornerstone of certain deontological theories. However, as with any philosophical concept, it can be debated and interpreted differently depending on one’s underlying ethical beliefs.
